Integrity Score 380
No Records Found
No Records Found
Chapter 2 continues…
On the whole, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, demoralized the Soviet people and the army, ridiculed the Soviet armed forces, drained the Soviet treasury and caused great diplomatic damage and undermined the Soviet leaders’ confidence in their own Marxist-Leninist ideology. For the Afghans it meant ‘the defeat of the state of Afghanistan’.33 The reported daily expenditures of Moscow in Afghanistan were around 10-12 million US dollars. Since the number of casualties was very high it led to ‘feuds and frustration’ in the military ranks34 . The war in the 1980’s wiped out most of the bureaucrats and the intelligentsia, who were either killed or forced to move abroad. They were replaced by special interest groups, either ethnically or religiously determined, inclined to promote their own interest rather than building up a state apparatus. As William Maley points out, the war in Afghanistan produced a multi-layered destruction of politics, economy and society, in ways, which remain massively apparent at the beginning of a new century35 . This process of disintegration of the Afghan state started during the war in the 1980s, but accentuated after the Soviet withdrawal. It was Gorbachev’s expressive awareness on increased defence expenditure and his general disbelief in the feasibility of military solutions to political problems that ultimately led to the announcement for troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.
In spite of being hailed as a success, the Geneva Accords had failed to address adequately the issue of the post-occupation period and the future governance of Afghanistan. The assumption among most Western diplomats was that the Soviet-backed government in Kabul would soon collapse; but this was not to be for another three years. During this time the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan (IIGA) was established in exile. The exclusion of key groups such as refugees and members of the Shiite community, combined with major disagreements between the different Mujahideen factions meant that the IIGA would never succeed as a functional government.
To be continued…