Pakistan's Last Gambit? Continues ......

No less critical a factor was the terrain that was unfeasible for covert operations by intelligence agencies and commandos.

This made it extremely difficult to expand the scope of operations beyond limited, preferably night-time commando operations. The harsh terrain and suspicious local tribes made it almost impossible to establish either a logistical supply line or a communication network, both essential for a longer and deeper operation against the entrenched adversary in a largely uncharted mountainous region.

Another reason why the operation sputtered so disastrously was that the Pakistan Army had no specific intelligence about the terrorists and their movements in the region, which has been a virtual no-man’s land since 1947. Many of those who were labelled as targets (by the US) were the ones who had been part of the US-led jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and had settled in the region. There were other terrorists who had come to Afghanistan from different corners of the world to fight the US forces and had stayed back in the safe tribal environs where they could buy protection. In addition, the region was populated with Afghan refugees, making it extremely difficult to distinguish terrorists from others.

The operations were stymied by the absence of a well-trained professional police force in the area. In counter-terrorism operations, much of the HUMINT (human intelligence) comes from the local police, as it has a better understanding of, and easier access to the community than the army. It was equally difficult to access TECHINT (technical intelligence) because the intercepted telecommunications between various terrorist leaders and groups were in a multitude of Pashto dialects, besides the language and dialects of the Uzbeks and Chechens. Translating and then deciphering them was a mindboggling task.

To be continued...