Critical Triangle continues ...

The Najibullah Government, however, proved resilient and outlived both the Reagan presidency and Zia-ul-Haq who died in plane crash on 17 August 1988.

Immediate disagreement, however, broke out between the CIA and the ISI on how to proceed. For its part the CIA wanted aid switched to more “liberal” leaders like Ahmad Shah Masood, while the ISI wanted to continue its help to the fundamentalists like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. As a test of its viability the mujahideen were asked by the new government of Benazir Bhutto to capture the city of Jalalabad to enable their formal recognition as an alternate government as opposed to being a mere rebel force.

As things turned out the rebels not only failed to capture the city but also failed to take the supply routes into the city.

However, as the Americans were to later admit they failed to see that US and Pakistani goals had diverged by this point. Richard Armitage, for example, was to say later, “we drifted along too long in 1989 and failed to understand the independent role that the ISI was playing.”

That realisation did, however, dawn by 1990. Either independently or because the cost benefit analysis had changed, the CIA had concluded that Pakistan had crossed the threshold and now “possessed” a nuclear bomb. By this time the two and a half year certification issued in 1987 had run out, and President Bush was in no position to renew it after the unambiguous opinions of the intelligence community. On 1 October 1990, failing certification, US$ 564 million of aid was suspended under the Pressler Amendment.

To be continued.....