Chapter 1 continues...

The talks were subsequently resumed and an apparent breakthrough was achieved in October 2013 when US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Afghanistan. Karzai claimed that during the visit the two sides had agreed on the issues of civilian casualty prevention, the definition of “aggression” in its relation to Afghan national security and, unilateral operations, which the US would not be allowed to carry out as per theBSA.
In November 2013, two days before a Loya Jirga was constituted to specifically discuss the BSA, a draft of the pact was agreed upon by the two countries. The draft required the US to maintain a total of 10,000 to 16,000 troops in Afghanistan, whose role will be restricted to training and advising the ANSF. The US will have independent control of the Bagram Air Base and small groups of US forces will be deployed to Afghan military bases at Kabul, Herat, Mazar, Kandahar, Shindand, Jalalabad, Helmand, and Gardez. While the contentious issue of troop immunity was resolved in favour of the US with it being granted final jurisdiction over its troops, the US was forced to make concessions on unilateral special operations. It is no longer allowed to carry out such operations unless requested by the Afghan government. Finally, it is also expected to undertake joint operations—political, military and economic—with the ANSF against any act of aggression, which includes giving support or providing a haven to insurgents keen to bring down the Afghan government.
Despite the overwhelming support in favour of the BSA from the Loya Jirga, President Karzai announced that the BSA should only be signed by his successor following the Presidential elections in April 2014. He also laid out certain preconditions for the US: transparent elections in April 2014, an end to raids into Afghan homes, a breakthrough in peace talks with the Taliban and the release of Afghan prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.

To be continued...