Hissing Dragon-Squirming Tiger:

Comparisons, Negotiations

and Attitudes continues....

The first such problem is best illustrated semi-anecdotally: It is believed that when a man propositions a lady and wants her to sleep with him, if she says ‘No’, she means ‘Maybe’; if she says ‘Maybe’, she means ‘Yes’; but if she says ‘Yes’, she’s no lady. Similarly, when a diplomat says, ‘Yes’, he means ‘Maybe’; if he says ‘Maybe’, he means ‘No’; but if he says ‘No’, he’s no diplomat.

Unfortunately for India, her first Prime Minister took it upon himself to start the process of settling the Sino-Tibetan border issue by saying ‘No’, thereby setting in chain a confrontational process which led to the unnecessary 1962 war.

In fact, Nehru started the process of boundary finalization with two ‘No’s’; the first ‘No’ being the unilateral Indian decision on what the SinoIndian boundary should be; i.e., where it should lie (as per his own onesided delimitation), and the second ‘No’ being his refusal to negotiate, except on the basis of the new Indian maps which showed the newly decided boundaries.

In the western sector, he decided that the Ladakh Tibet border should be the proposed Johnson-Ardagh Line, disregarding the fact that the British themselves had doubts about its validity and its practicality, and the fact that the only boundary they had formally ever

offered the Chinese government was the Macartney-MacDonald Line of 1899. This, ironically approximates the Chinese ‘Claim Line’ of the post-1954 period. In the eastern sector, in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA, Nehru rigidly adhered to his public stand that the boundary was the McMahon Line, which the Chinese had never accepted.

To be continued.........