Critical Triangle continues....

Eisenhower flew to Kabul and found Daoud deeply distrustful of Pakistan, but believed that the Soviets were a worthwhile risk to take as long as they expressed a willingness to “assist Afghanistan’s
economy and build a military force.” Eisenhower remained in two minds, on one hand believing the Afghans to be a “tough independent people” and on the other hand expressing grave doubts to Francisco Franco.
Kennedy’s victory in the 1960 presidential election was viewed dimly in Pakistan. His view of foreign policy contrasted significantly with Pakistan’s narrative and the Eisenhower vision.

In an essay in Foreign Affairs, he had called for greater cooperation with the “uncommitted world” and had pushed through Senate
resolutions calling for increased aid to India.

This view was largely reflected on Afghanistan as well, where he disagreed with Ayub on the extent of the former’s alignment with the USSR. By 1961, cross border raids by Afghan tribesmen into Pakistan had escalated the bilateral dynamic—with diplomatic relations being broken off and the border being sealed. Intensive American engagement to break the deadlock ensued, but achieved little given Ayub’s fatalistic prognosis of the Afghan situation.

CHINA

No analysis of US-Pakistan relations on Afghanistan can be complete without contextualising the Chinese. From the very start of Afghan insecurities over the Northern Tier strategy, Pakistan gave Afghanistan ample excuse to worry. Pakistan’s only de facto border with a communist country was China, through the disputed Northern Areas of Kashmir. Yet at the very outset of the operationalisation of the Northern Tier strategy Pakistan had made clear that when it talked of communism it meant the USSR and not China.

To be continued....