The Sino-Indian Boundary Issue continues....

The Chinese also created administrative units within Qinghai and in the adjoining neighbouring Chinese provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan, where Tibetans were the majority residents, calling them ‘Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures’, such as the Habei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture within Qinghai province. (see map) The demand for merger of Amdo and of these enclaves with the TAR, the ‘independence’ of Tibet, and related aspects are issues for the non-resident Tibetans, not for the Government of India. In 1990 the Chinese government had rejected a proposal by the Dalai Lama that Tibet should be granted an associate status in which Tibetans would have a high degree of domestic autonomy with China remaining in charge of foreign affairs and defence. The Chinese government rejected this concept because, according to them, ‘It attempts to turn the question of regional autonomy for minority nationalities within the territory of China into one of relations between a Suzerain State and a dependency.’

Strategic and Local Military Issues: The militarisation of Tibet and the placement by the Chinese of a very significant missile force on the Tibetan plateau is not a diplomatic issue, but concerns Indian strategic planners. Similarly, of course, the Indian missile programme and nuclear capability is a matter of concern to the Chinese. These subjects do not form part of any negotiations with China on the boundary issue.

They would nevertheless, in all probability, be kept at the back of the minds of both governments during the negotiation process. The only military issues which concern the Sino-Indian boundary dispute itself are: (1) The ways to reduce local border incidents escalating into local armed conflicts. (2) As a negotiating point, the desirability of an agreed border which is militarily suitable for either side. (3) Measures that can be taken to de-militarize the border zone or the frontier region itself.

To be continued...