Critical Traingle continues.....

By 1950, these contradictions came into sharp focus. A State Department memorandum to the White House opined “the entire South Asian region is of relatively secondary importance to the US from a military point of view, although Pakistan might have value in the event of a war with the Soviet Union as a place from which US aircraft could operate. However, this should not be openly stressed since it negates our oft-expressed interest in helping the region for economic reasons.” But in 1951, since the outbreak of the Korean War, the US had grown weary of Pakistan trying to link providing troops in Korea to Kashmir and India.

By 1952 though, India’s relations with the USSR had warmed considerably. Kashmir was no longer at the periphery of the Cold War. Jacob Malik, the USSR’s UN representative, started raking up the Kashmir issue claiming that the West “intended to transform Kashmir and Pakistan into a military springboard against the USSR and a new China.

Parallel to this worry in the US of Soviet influence in the subcontinent, was their concern over the tense relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Largely this had to do with the Durand Line and Pashtunistan. In Karachi, however, this was seen as the result of Indian incitement and an Afghan tactic of deflection due to the acute governance deficit.

The US concerns here revolved around a possible breakdown of relations resulting in Pakistan blocking trade access to Afghan goods, which would then automatically turn to the Soviet Union in the north. The Korean War exacerbated this fear on several grounds, including a possibly more aggressive posture by the Soviets. Curiously Pakistan’s desire for international mediation on Kashmir was reversed here, as Pakistan considered the NWFP to be an internal issue with no need for external mediation. In spite of this the US would launch a diplomatic effort in November 1950.

To be continued......