External Actors in the Afghan Problem continues....

Apart from military supplies, the trans-national linkages helped form political alliances which were also broken at a dizzying speed. All this led to hatred and animosities perpetuating casualties of immense proportions. For example, in Kunduz province in early 1980s, fighters belonging to Jamiat-e-Islami killed many civilians on the suspicion of collaboration with the government.

The result was that the whole population of the valley went over to the government and became the strongest group of militiamen. In Ghor province, a large number of fighters belonging to Harkat-e-Inqilab joined government militias to fight more effectively against their local rivals belonging to Hizb-e-Islami. In 1986, continuous fighting between Hizb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami in northern area alienated the local population and 3,000 Uzbek families switched sides to the government and became militia members. The orgy of bloodshed which followed was unprecedented in the history of Afghanistan. The Geneva Accords of April 1988 marked a turning point by providing a political framework for the Soviet troop withdrawal, but did not provide for a permanent solution to the conflict as such.

This accord led to the conflict losing its global geo-strategic significance for some times to come. But conflict soon resumed, although in the downgraded version of a civil war, by the internal actors, their source of sustenance coming primarily from the neighbouring countries. The fall of Khost to the Mujahideen in March 1991 was a classical example of the reincarnation of medieval thought process of the resistance. The ISI gave in to the wishes of the local commanders and reached an agreement with the latter about the distribution of the booty prior to assault. After the fall of Khost, the resistance groups, the Mujahideen, pillaged the town rather than administering it.

To be continued.....