Chapter 2 continues…

Omar refused to accept that Osama was behind the 9/11 attacks, asking for evidence linking him to the incident. Moreover, he was unwilling to hand over Osama to a non-Muslim country, but was open to letting Osama be tried in an Afghan court or in any other Muslim country.

By the late 1990s, the Pakistani establishment began to grow weary of the Taliban, realising that the Taliban had become something of a Frankenstein’s monster for Pakistan.65 The Taliban gave sanctuary and armed the most violent Sunni extremist groups in Pakistan, which attacked Pakistani Shias, wanted Pakistan declared a Sunni state and advocated the overthrow of the ruling elite through an Islamic revolution.

Despite this realisation and the Taliban’s defiance of Pakistani authority, Pakistan continued to advocate for the Taliban on the grounds that the unacceptable aspects of their rule were temporary and likely to change as they settled into a governing role. They argued that international engagement could even hasten the process. Pakistan maintained its support for the Taliban, hoping that eventually, like many regimes, the Taliban would survive sanctions and change just enough to gain some international recognition.

In complete violation of the UN sanctions Pakistan continued to supply arms to the Taliban and the ISI put together the “Afghan Defence Council” made up of forty Pakistani Islamic political parties designed to resist UN pressure and register support for the Taliban. The ISI’s stand was that unless the US lifted the multiple sanctions on Pakistan and improved relations, Pakistan would neither turn against the Taliban nor provide the intelligence or military support needed to snatch Osama. It was the attacks of 9/11, however, which, were to have the most significant impact on this relation.

To be continued…