Chapter 2 continues…

Pakistan was also a diplomatic link to the outside world for the Taliban and was one of the only three countries to recognise it, the other two being Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In fact, after the imposition of UN sanctions on Afghanistan in 1999 and 2000, the Afghan Embassy in Islamabad would serve as the Taliban’s means of communication with the rest of the world. All foreign diplomats who had business with the Taliban would engage with the Afghan Embassy in Islamabad.

In fact, Pakistan’s decision to recognise the Taliban movement as the legitimate government of Afghanistan in 1997 was motivated by its desire to act as a bridge between the Taliban and the international community, and enhance its own global standing. Islamabad also launched a massive diplomatic and public relations campaign to promote the Taliban as the strongest and most popular force in Afghanistan. It spared no effort to sell the Taliban to Saudi Arabia and the US as a player capable of not only bringing stability to Afghanistan—which was important for the American objective of building an oil pipeline across Afghanistan connecting Pakistan and Turkmenistan—but also serving their interests, especially against Iran, in the region.

Pakistan also played a large role in brokering alliances for the Taliban with other Afghan factions. Pakistan was able to integrate the Haqqani Network, led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, with the Taliban. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the ISI also played a pivotal role in setting up the first meeting between the Taliban and Osama bin Laden in the hope that the two would work together, especially to help train Kashmiri militants.

Pakistan also attempted, unsuccessfully, to broker a deal between the Taliban, Dostum and Massoud. First the Bhutto government, and subsequently the Nawaz Sharif government, constantly travelled between the various power centres in Afghanistan to get the different factions to agree on a minimum agenda so that a dialogue between them could begin. Although the factions agreed on the terms of such reconciliation—ceasefire, demilitarisation of Kabul and exchange of prisoners—they could not agree on the sequencing of such terms.

To be continued…