Chapter 2 continues..

The Taliban essentially consisted of Afghan refugees and war veterans, who had received education, military training, shelter and food in these madrasas, which subsequently also served as recruiting centres. Pakistan believed that in such madrasas the Pashtun Afghan Islamism had undergone a fusion of clan, religious and political identities, which erased the Taliban’s attachment to the Afghan identity – because of which the Taliban leaders were completely devoid of any enthusiasm for Pashtunistan or the Durand Line that had permeated even some Islamists like Hekmatyar. It was these close ethnic, social and religious linkages that found favour among the Pakistan elite, who felt that the Taliban could serve as an amenable proxy in Kabul.

Pakistan also believed that the Taliban's rigid Islamic ideology and emphasis on Islamic brotherhood would, by extension, lead to an anti-India stand. Thus, it was naturally expected by Pakistan that the Taliban would limit India’s influence in Afghanistan and prevent it from using the country as a base against Pakistan. The Indian government also drew on these linkages between the Taliban and Pakistan to form its perception of the movement as an inherently anti-India force and intensified its support for the anti- Taliban Northern Alliance. In fact, the Taliban government was the first Afghan government to have no contacts with India whatsoever, limiting India’s influence to only the northern provinces that were under the control of Massoud.

In the 1990s, the Kashmir issue had also become a factor behind Pakistan’s support for the Taliban. The link between Pakistan’s involvement in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the situation in Afghanistan can be traced back to the late 1980s. Having successfully undermined the Soviet military occupation through its support for the Afghan Jihad, Pakistan wanted to use the same tactics in Jammu and Kashmir as well in order to ‘bleed’ India and keep its troops tied down in the state, forcing it to move troops away from its border with Pakistan. However, Pakistan was aware of the fact that there were not enough native guerrillas for such a strategy to be successful in J&K.

To be continued…