‘Operation LEGHORN’ and the

Battle of the Namka Chu continues....

By 2nd October, 4 Division’s Tactical Headquarters (Tac HQ) had been established at Zemithang, in the Nyamjang Chu valley about 10 km south of the Khinzemane border post.

The 7 Brigade administrative base at Lumpu was a hard four days’ march from Tawang. With the winter rapidly approaching and in the already severe cold, maintaining 7 Infantry Brigade in the Namka Chu area was not possible for move than a few days. Whether the Chinese remained comfortably dug-in on the Thagla Ridge or withdrew, and even if they had not attacked, 7 Infantry Brigade would have had to be withdrawn from the Namka Chu-Dhola area within a few days for logistical reasons alone. The troops had less than three days’ rations available, and only 50 rounds of ammunition for each man’s personal weapon.

The next step taken was to divest Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh of the responsibility for NEFA.

Thus the Defence Minister and the Army Chief, who had wanted to remove Gen. Umrao Singh without appearing to do so, so that ‘Operation ONKAR’ could be speeded up, created a ‘special’ 4 Corps, a formation in name only, which took over the responsibility for NEFA. On 3rd October, 1962, Army HQ replaced HQ 33 Corps with HQ 4 Corps. Brig. Dalvi comments:

‘Gen. Kaul arrived at Tezpur on 4th October and amazingly was received at the airport by his Army Commander anextraordinary reversal of military protocol. The armies of the world are usually very fussy about such matters.

This is not intended to be a petty barb. It is to illustrate Kaul’s power and prestige: material factors which were to gravely influence the course of events in the succeeding days. Anyone exercising authority beyond his rank is bound to stifle disagreement, discourage frank discussions and brow-beat subordinates.

To be continued...