Chapter 2 continues…

Despite his military assault and the devastation caused over a period of nearly four years, Hekmatyar was unable to seize Kabul, thereby provoking the need for a tactical rethink on the part of Pakistan.

The threat posed by the increasing Indian and Iranian influence in Afghanistan and the failure of Hekmatyar to capture Kabul was further compounded by the fact that the perpetual violence and instability in Afghanistan was acting as a major obstacle to Pakistan’s aim of opening up direct land-trade routes with Central Asia.

The quickest land route would have been via Kabul and Northern Afghanistan to Central Asia. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the creation of the new Central Asian Republics (CARs) had opened up new prospects for other regional countries. Pakistan looked at the CARs as potential sources of energy, new markets and trading partners, which were necessary to revive Pakistan’s economy, which was in a dire state in the 1990s. None of the economic targets had been met, its economic growth was less than 3 percent, there was rampant poverty and unemployment, and unfavourably high rates of trade deficit, inflation and balance of payment. Moreover, the downgrading of American aid from 1991 had made it even tougher for Pakistan to sustain its already stagnant economy.

Pakistan’s Afghan policy was facing a dilemma. It could carry on backing Hekmatyar in a bid to bring a Pashtun group to power in Kabul which would be Pakistan-friendly or it could change direction and urge for a power-sharing agreement between all the Afghan factions at whatever the price for the Pashtuns so that a stable Afghan government could open roads to Central Asia.

The Pakistan military and intelligence wanted to maintain support for Hekmatyar, but his military failures had made him expendable. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan coincided with Pakistan’s increasing disenchantment with Hekmatyar, thereby providing the Pakistan government with an alternative proxy in the country.