Chapter 2 continues…

These commanders also played a vital role in providing intelligence about the Soviet and Afghan governments’ military activities and information about the performances of the mujahideen. Pakistanis, usually from the army’s elite Special Services Group (SSG), at times accompanied trained mujahideen units crossing the northern Afghan border to conduct sabotage in Soviet Central Asia.

AFGHAN CIVIL WAR

As it became clear that the Soviet Union was likely to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, attention shifted towards the nature of the post-Soviet government in Afghanistan. Even before the Soviet Union had publicly announced decision to withdraw, it had discreetly asked Pakistan for its help in pursuing a government of national reconciliation through dialogue between the mujahideen leaders and President Muhammad Najibullah. Pakistan, however, did not respond seriously to such a request due to suspicions over Soviet intentions, believing the request to be a ploy to weaken the Afghan resistance.

Moreover, among Pakistani policymakers, there was a difference of opinion between Zia and his civilian Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo. Zia felt that given the risks taken by Pakistan as a frontline state the future government in Kabul should be determined by it. He considered it Pakistan’s right to be able to install a friendly Afghan government in order to prevent a return to the pre-war situation marked by a large Indian and Soviet influence and Afghan claims on Pakistani territory.

Thus, he had declared that Pakistan would not sign the Geneva Accords unless Moscow removed Najibullah from power and agreed to an interim government chosen through a process dominated by the Pakistan- based resistance groups. Zia was even willing to delay the Soviet withdrawal in order to meet this end.

To be continued…