Chapter 2 continues…

Such discretion was sought to be achieved in two ways. First, it was agreed that only Warsaw Pact weapons would be supplied to the mujahideen so that they could not be traced back to the US. Many of the weapons initially used were Soviet-made, captured from government forces or sold by deserters. Gradually, Soviet- made weapons from Egypt, China and Israel, which had been captured during the 1967 War, also began to be used. Pakistan served as a go-between to contract the Chinese government to manufacture the requisite weapons.

The second way, which was to have a serious impact on the future of Pakistani politics, was the total and exclusive control of the ISI over the running of the Afghan Jihad so that it could regulate the number of weapons going into Afghanistan. The ISI’s role in the Afghan Jihad and the massive funding it received from the US and Saudi Arabia enabled it to emerge as one of the most powerful institutions in the country, a role that it continues to hold.

In particular it was the Afghan Bureau, which was the chief conductor of the Afghan Jihad. The headquarters of the Afghan Bureau, called the Ojhri Camp, was located in the outskirts of Rawalpindi and was the command post for the war. The camp was responsible for controlling the day-to-day planning of operations, selection of targets, and provision of training to the mujahideen. It also oversaw collection and distribution of weapons and psychological warfare, which included the operation of three border radio stations, distribution of leaflets and conducting interviews. The ISI also set up training camps along the Durand Line and by 1987 the camps in Pakistan had provided training to over 80,000 fighters.

To be continued…