Integrity Score 390
No Records Found
No Records Found
The Forward Policy and
‘Operation ONKAR’continues...
These posts were not strong defensible military positions as such,
but were meant to show Indian ‘possession’, in the belief that China was
expanding its control in Tibet by militarily occupying ‘vacant space’,
and would stop where it saw existing ‘possession’. Only in 1961 did
India consider it necessary to take ‘limited defensive measures to contain Chinese incursions into Indian territory’. This led to numerous small clashes with Chinese troops, Indian policemen getting taken prisoner in Ladakh, and acts of military intimidation at Khinzemane
and Longju in NEFA, during the period 1959-62, and set the stage for
the 1962 war.
The originator of this policy is unclear from the voluminous writings on the subject and on the subsequent war of 1962,
with even those in the policy-making loop disclaiming progeniture in
their books. However, the formal basis is undoubtedly the set of basic
recommendations arrived at by the high-level and properly-constituted
Committee under the chairmanship of the Deputy Defence Minister,
Maj. Gen. Himmatsinghji. But circumstancially it would appear that
the main proponent for the 1959-1962 forward ‘push’ was the head of
the Intelligence Bureau, B.N. Mullik, supported by the politically ambitious general, B.M. Kaul, whose meteoric rise was greatly due to his personal proximity to the Prime Minister.
Indeed at first the PLA simply withdrew, but eventually Chinese forces
began to counter-encircle the Indian positions. This led to a tit-for-tat
Indian reaction, with both forces attempting to outmanoeuver each other.
However, despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces
withheld from engaging each other directly. (Wikipedia)
To be continued...