Chapter 2 continues…

A base had already been created for Pakistan to wage such a policy. The 1978 coup against Daoud by Marxist officers of the Afghan army and the influence of communist ideology in the new government’s policies, such as women’s emancipation and land reforms, had led to the outbreak of a rebellion in the Afghan countryside.

The Islamist leaders like Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Massoud played a leading role in such movements. As described above, the ISI and Pakistani religious parties had already established linkages with these Islamists, which were to be significantly strengthened over the next decade.

General Akhtar, the then DG of the ISI is said to have made a presentation to Gen. Zia-ul Haq, Pakistan’s President, forcefully recommending that Pakistan should back the Afghan resistance. Akhtar argued that such support would become a crucial strategy in Pakistan’s forward defence against the Soviets. Zia was motivated by other considerations as well for pursuing such a policy. The Soviet invasion provided an opportunity to Pakistan to mend its relations with the US, which had significantly deteriorated following Bhutto’s attempts to develop a nuclear bomb.

The reduction of US aid had a crippling effect on Pakistan’s economy. However, the US was now eager to keep Soviet forces tied down in Afghanistan and avenge its own military humiliation in Vietnam by making Afghanistan the ‘Soviet Union’s Vietnam.’

The Zia regime calculated that by playing a leading role in assisting and facilitating the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union, Pakistan would not only be able to benefit from closer ties with the West, but also secure substantial military and financial assistance from the US, which could eventually be used by the Pakistan Army to compete against India. Similar considerations also prompted Gen Musharraf to join the US-led Global War on Terror following the 9/11 attacks.

To be continued…