Nehru’s Folly and the ‘Loss’ of Tibet continues....

Such a scenario may appear farfetched now, but the fact that it was seriously considered is supported by the next reason being given. Third, Pandit Nehru’s own statements rejecting the proposal point to his being well aware of the details worked out, evidently between the respective Army Headquarters of both India and Pakistan. In January 1960, referring to the proposal at the annual Congress Party meeting in Bangalore, he said ‘Does it mean that armies must march across India? Whatever the consequences, India would never allow foreign armies on her soil even for her defence.’

As eventually happened, with the Chinese threat beginning to loom, 4 Infantry Division had to be moved from Ambala in late 1959 to take over the responsibility for Sikkim and NEFA. Once hostilities began in October 1962, the remaining Indian formations in the Punjab facing Pakistan, i.e., 5 Infantry Division, 27 Infantry Division, and the newly raised Western Command Reserve, 17 Infantry Division, which was now positioned at Ambala, had to be hurriedly pulled out and sent to the east, leaving the Punjab totally defenceless and exposed to a potential Pakistani attack for some time, till overall re-adjustments could be made.

To be continued...