Chapter 2 continues…

However, this policy was to undergo a change following the coup in Afghanistan in 1973, which overthrew the Afghan monarchy and saw the return of Daoud Khan as the President of Afghanistan. Daoud was a strong proponent of the Pashtunistan cause and was responsible for much of the bilateral antagonism in the 1950s and early 1960s when he was the Prime Minister of Afghanistan.

The 1973 coup had coincided with the uprising in the tribal areas of Balochistan and parts of the NWFP that was actively supported by the Afghan Intelligence Agencies.

Babar, who subsequently would play a major role in convincing the ISI to extend support to the Taliban in the 1990s, geared Pakistan towards pursuing a more pro-active offensive policy towards Afghanistan. This long-term plan naturally included support for groups that could act as proxies for Pakistan in Afghanistan and serve its interests. Babar defended this policy by claiming that since Pakistan had “a permanent geopolitical interest in Afghanistan” it should “groom people from inside Afghanistan to guard that interest.”

An important aspect of this policy was the provision of safe haven and military training to violent Islamist factions inside Afghanistan, who were opposed to and wanted to bring down the existing regime in Afghanistan. An “AfghanCell” was created in the Foreign Office in mid-1973, which met regularly for the next three years under the chairmanship of Bhutto or Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed, and gave out policy guidelines.

The IG Frontier Constabulary and the Director General (DG) ISI worked in concert to conduct intelligence missions inside Afghanistan. Between 1973 and 1977, Pakistan trained an estimated 5,000 Afghans in secret military camps, which eventually culminated in a series of Pakistani-backed incursions into eastern Afghanistan in mid-1975. The most well-known uprising against the Daoud government occurred in the Panjshir area in July 1975.

To be continued…