I was then new to the district having joined on the 4th August, 2008. As a new Superintendent of Police in the Maoist affected district, my first priority was to properly understand the area and its difficult terrain. I needed to look for safe bases where forces could camp and from where operations could be launched into the forests. I had the experience of having worked earlier in the forests of Bagaha on the Nepal border, where I had been quite successful in containing the Maoists by a mixed strategy which included both planned operations as well as involving the community in policing. But the terrain of Rohtas was much different from that of Bagaha.

While Bagaha had not yet witnessed an IED blast on the road, it had been repeated several times in Rohtas resulting in heavy casualty of the forces. Though both the places did not have concrete roads in the operational areas, the danger of IED’s was real in the case of Rohtas. Further, to launch any operation one had to travel uphill into the den of the Maoists having no police presence and using the same mined roads for not less than 22 kms from any access point.

Travelling on foot could not advance one daily for more than 10 kms in the hostile territory, and I as a new Superintendent of Police wanted to do it fast in order to see the jurisdiction I had been entrusted with along with its share of problems. The tactical operations could be conducted only after the leader had well understood the area. For the same purpose I extensively used the weapons of surprise and courage, and reached points uphill using vehicles in the wee hours of the night in order to be present in the operational area for not more than 2 hours after daylight, extensively photographing the terrain and always on the move. Never did we use the same route during the return.