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Prologue continues......
In 2017 there was a 72-day stand-off in the east, between the Indian Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) near the China-India- Bhutan tri-junction, on Bhutanese territory adjacent to Indian territory in Sikkim, under an Indian treaty obligation to Bhutan. From 1hth June to 28th August 2017 the Indian Army stood firm and resolute, preventing Chinese road-building into Bhutan. The place is known as Doklam, and in Chinese as Donglang or Donglang Caochang. The thwarted Chinese believed they had suffered a great loss of ‘face’ in being stopped by ‘the inferior army of an inferior country’. It was a watershed incident for the People’s Republic of China, and a ‘face-saving’ military operation by the PLA should have been anticipated, but evidently wasn’t.
In April-May 2020 the PLA moved forward from its routine spring training areas in the Aksai Chin-western Tibet border region westwards into disputed territory within India’s claimed boundary in Eastern Ladakh, and firmly established itself on the ground in a new set of forward positions, thereby altering what was believed by India to be the Line of Actual Control (LAC), including the eastern edge of the Galwan River valley, where armed confrontations had taken place in July 19h2. Why did the Indian Army not forestall these forward moves by China, even using smaller numbers of troops to swiftly occupy advantageous positions? This and related questions will no doubt get answered over time, but there seems to be no doubt that the Indian establishment, including its military, seems to get lulled into complacency on a continuing basis about China’s intentions.
To be continued......