Bumla-Tawang-Sela-Bomdila continues....

Regarding the disgraceful Sela fiasco, the ‘History’ comments:

In such a climate of retreat and demoralization, the wildest rumours were believed, and any tactical withdrawal could turn into a rout. And this is what happened at Se La.

The Se La position was exceedingly strong, well-stocked and held by a brigade of five battalions. Troops were first told that Se La would be held even if its Line of Communications (L of C) was cut.

Then on 17th evening they learnt that withdrawal would again start the next night. But within few hours they saw 2 Sikh LI being pulled back, their confusion and demoralization was complete and the rout began.

The ‘History’ analyses the causes of defeat in the Kameng sector as follows:

An enemy Division of about four brigades, thus defeated and destroyed 4 Inf Div of three brigades in defensive positions when normally a successful attack required a numerical superiority of 3:1.

The enemy, moreover, had no artillery support, and had been able to carry only mortars and MGs with him over the difficult mountain tracks. Though most of the Indian troops were hurriedly inducted from the plains and thrown into battle without proper acclimatization or winter equipment, the basic causes of the defeat lay in the areas of leadership and morale.

There was no question of or thought of recapturing Tawang but only of holding up the Chinese advance at Se La, or even at Bomdi La. The all-important initiative, therefore, always remained with the enemy, and he could choose the time and place for his next blow.

To be continued.......