Nehru’s Folly and the ‘Loss’ of Tibet continues....

He was also given the military opinion that it was not possible for the Indian Army to increase its presence in Tibet, because of its pre-occupation with the operations in J&K.

Additionally, his own vast knowledge of history provided a rationale for his disinclination for the dangerous military option. He cited the instance of the Dogra general Zorawar Singh’s failure in the 1841 winter campaign in Western Tibet to explain to Parliament that it was impossible for Indian troops to defend Tibet. In the event, the pacifist Tibetans woke up too late, only after the Chinese Army had already occupied Lhasa, and the subsequent uprising in Lhasa and the Khampa resistance proved a matter of ‘too little; too late’.

But it is worth noting that had the PRC’s Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai been on the Indian side, it is more than likely that they would have militarily intervened in Tibet, by rushing some troops to eastern Tibet and thus pre-empted the PLA’s move into central Tibet.

Bolstering the resistance of the Khampas of eastern Tibet, while raising additional forces in India to assist in maintaining the sanctity of the Pakistan border, was well within the realm of possibility, had the political and military leaders chosen to think that way.

Even the militarily relatively inexperienced Netaji Subhash Bose in combination with Sardar Patel might have chosen such a path. With the PLA kept at bay, a Tibetan Army with American arms and Indian air cover, could well have ensured an independent Tibet after eastern Tibet had been retaken.

To be continued...