Chapter 1 Continued...

However, the claim made by the NATO report that Afghans frequently prefer Taliban governance over that of the Afghan government “as a result of government corruption, ethnic bias and lack of connection with local religious and tribal leaders” is not completely unfounded.
The Taliban, on account of this popularity, combined with the lack of effective governance, retains the ability to recruit fighters on a consistent basis. The number of armed cadres under the Taliban banner has been difficult to pinpoint but estimates put the figure between 25,000 and 30,000. The group has enough sophisticated weapons, regular ammunition supply, expertise in making IEDs and suicide bomb vests, as well as access to training facilities and former military and mujahideen commanders as trainers to make up for any shortage of fighters. The Taliban’s modes of attack have become more sophisticated and brazen. Their tactics involve the use of IEDs, mines and suicide attacks, supplemented in large measure by intimidation, abductions and assassinations.
The resilience of the Taliban is apparent from the three-fold increase in violence that Afghanistan witnessed in 2013. A total of 5,922 security-related incidents were recorded from May to August 2013, an 11 percent increase from 2012 during the same period. The Taliban resorted to a number of high profile attacks during the year. These included attacks on the National Directorate of Security and suicide attacks near the Indian Consulate in Jalalabad, Afghan Ministry of Defence, the Presidential Palace, the Supreme Court, an ISAF compound in Kabul, the US Consulate in Herat, and US forces based at Torkham Port. In January 2014, the Taliban also attacked a Lebanese restaurant in the heavily fortified and secure diplomatic area in Kabul, killing foreigners working with the UN and the IMF. Such high profile attacks have become a trademark of the Taliban.

To be continued...