Critical Triangle continues...

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was even less diplomatic. She insisted the Indian threat was a phantom one, and that Pakistan had to make a strategic choice that “association with terrorists has to come to an end” and that it could not “keep these people as an option.” She insisted that direct links existed between the LeT and the ISI.

Shortly thereafter, the required evidence was provided to Pakistan. In early 2009, when Gen Pasha visited Washington, he admitted to “retired Pakistan Army Officers” planning the Mumbai attacks and promised to deal with the issue.

Later during a chat with Ambassador Haqqani, he glossed over the issue basically wanting the Americans to forget about the episode and move on, in effect, admitting he intended to do nothing.

Shortly thereafter, Vice-President elect Joe Biden visited Pakistan and offered President Zardari a grand bargain, much on the same lines albeit less threatening than what Colin Powell had offered Musharraf in 2001. In effect it was the same argument that every Administration since Eisenhower had used to justify aid to Pakistan—align with US priorities (i.e shift focus away from India) and America will help you. In effect this was the same “US aid as a dampener of Pakistani revisionism argument” used so often. And yet again like every time before, it fell on deaf ears.

Shortly thereafter Pakistan’s courts released disgraced nuclear scientist A Q Khan, apparently signalling that Pakistan’s attitudes were not about to change. When the Kerry-Lugar bill authorised a further US$ 7.5 billion for Pakistan, the Army reacted furiously to the condition that said aid was dependent on the military not intervening in politics.

To be continued...