Critical Triangle continues....

Almost immediately the fallacy of these sweeping assumptions began to show. Within weeks the government was bogged down by corruption charges, ineptitude and controversy.

The military and the ISI remained out of civilian control, neither subjecting themselves to the purported desire of the civilian dispensation to de-securitise Pakistan’s core beliefs, nor shifting course on support for jihadis in Afghanistan. Zardari had tried, both, to bring the ISI under civilian control and to change the discourse by arguing for a No First Use policy on nuclear weapons, but these had to be shelved rapidly, one can only presume, under duress.

Notwithstanding, having seen the transition from military to civilian rule (Zardari had been elected President in September 2008) the US still helped Pakistan secure US$ 7.6 billion from the IMF, and similarly shifted US$ 230 million from counterterrorism aid towards upgrading F-16s, which the Pakistan Air Force claimed it would use to bomb terrorists. Members of
Congress, however, thought that this was akin to “hitting a fly with a sledgehammer.” The request for this funding shift had come specifically from the elected civilian government, belying both the supposed priority to de-securitise Pakistan’s policies as well as to focus on fighting terrorism. This period also coincided with the ISI going slow on authorisations for drone strikes within Pakistan, effectively encouraging the CIA to bypass civilian authority.

In effect, Pakistan was asking for a say on who the drones could target, to maintain a fine balance amongst various Taliban factions, eliminating those who opposed them, while protecting the more pliable factions. Requests for action against the Haqqani Network and the Quetta Shura were turned down, and made conditional on more aid for fighting conventional wars rather than
fighting insurgencies.

To be continued....