Critical Triangle continues.....

Despite the growing acrimony between the US and Pakistan, the US continued to see Pakistan’s actions as being directly related to India. President Bush, for example, acknowledged that Musharraf either “would not or could not” fulfil his promises.

“Part of the problem was Pakistan’s obsession with India.

In almost every conversation we had, Musharraf accused India of wrongdoing.”

Despite averting a major catastrophe in 2001-2002, despite the massive volume of military aid being given to Pakistan, and despite Pakistan having proven both its immunity to Indian conventional retaliation in the wake of 2001 and its ability to proactively change the status quo under the nuclear umbrella in 1999 (Kargil); President Bush found that “the Pakistani military spent most of its resources preparing for war with India. Its troops were trained to wage a conventional battle with its neighbour, not counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas. The fight against extremists came second.”

By 2007, US patience with Pakistan was wearing thin, as the contradictions of the 7 June 2002 compact was taking a heavy toll in Afghanistan.

On 26 February 2007 Vice President Cheney and CIA Deputy Director Steve Knappes warned Musharraf during an unannounced visit to Islamabad that the tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border had become a de-facto safe haven for both al Qaeda and the Taliban. In the face of Pakistani unwillingness to deal with this problem, the use of drones was ramped up. As the US tone became tougher, Pakistan’s victimhood narrative became shriller, blaming the US for the huge spurt in terrorism on Pakistani soil as well as for casting Pakistan as the fall guy for US failure to stabilise Afghanistan.

To be continued...