Critical Triangle continues.....

The consequences of the Twin Peaks crisis were far ranging. With the benefit of hindsight we can confidently say that what Pakistan had lost in terms of “sub-conventional” freedom of action on 11 September 2001, it had clawed back rapidly by 10 June 2002.

While credit must be given to decision makers at the time for avoiding any further escalation, the long term consequences for the stability of Afghanistan and India-Pakistan relations would be enormous. The immediate effect of the 7 June 2002 compact started being felt in Afghanistan by 2005, where by this time the Taliban had well and truly regrouped. The base where they were trained, sustained and sent into Afghanistan was in Pakistan which persisted in denying any involvement.

However, most NATO and ISAF intelligence agencies had concluded by this time that Pakistan was a “principal recruiting ground and logistical centre for global terrorists.”

Reviewing just one source of reportage—in this case The New York Times—from the period of 2003 to 2008 shows the increasingly negative reportage of Pakistan in the US press.

Yet just as negative perceptions of Pakistan were growing, total aid from 2002 to 2012 reached US$ 25 billion.

The assumption was that such a significant quantum of aid would ameliorate Pakistani security concerns vis-à-vis India on the one hand while on the other it would serve to reorient Pakistan's Afghan policy to be in step with US policy there. Yet as can be seen the revolving door pattern set in the 2001-2003 period remained in place, with no fundamental shift in Pakistan’s position

To be continued....