Critical Triangle continues .....

The net result of the Twin Peaks Crisis was that despite the drawdown that started on 10 June 2002, all sides tacitly accepted that Pakistan could continue to maintain terror as a tool of state policy—something that would come back to haunt India in 2008 and more importantly the US for the rest of its involvement in Afghanistan.

India, for its part, desperately wanted a face–saving exit from the brink and was willing to accept Musharraf’s assurances, minus any concrete actions. It was happy to deescalate despite its grave reservations. As Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh said (sarcastically and presciently) “Pakistan is an ally of the United States of America. Good luck to the United States of America.” The US wanted some kind of solution that would not disrupt and help it focus on its mission in Afghanistan.

The big winner though was Pakistan, which, in spite of facing an existential threat over its use of sub-state proxies, had gone back to the pre-9/11 situation, where its use of such proxies no longer entailed the threats they had immediately after 9/11 and the Parliament attack.

In effect Pakistan had turned things back to how they were antebellum. Moreover despite immediate and tangible cause-effect correlation that US proximity to Pakistan acted more as an enabler of Pakistani revisionism, US aid continued due to the equities the US had invested in Afghanistan.

To be continued....