Chapter 1 Continues...

The group, headquartered in Miramshah in North Waziristan, has benefited from its close ties to the Pakistan Army in developing such offensive capabilities. It is capable of undertaking suicide bombings, launching armed assaults on protected targets and ‘siege and seize’ operations in urban areas.
The Taliban is the strongest in southern and eastern Afghanistan, from Helmand to Nuristan, including Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Paktika, Ghazni, Paktia, Logar, Nangarhar, Laghman, and Kunar. These are areas, where the threat of a Taliban takeover is the greatest. In fact, the draft of the ‘Peace Process Roadmap to 2015,’ released in early 2012, and said to be drafted by the Afghan government, envisaged the devolution of power to the Taliban in these provinces. While it is unlikely that the Taliban will succeed in taking over 90 percent of the country as it had in the 1990s, there is a high possibility of it increasing its influence and control over these areas in the near future. The British Army Chief, Sir Peter Wall, had also warned in December 2013 that the Taliban could retake some territories in southern Afghanistan post-2014.5 The Taliban has made its presence felt in northern and western Afghanistan as well. However, in these parts of the country, the problem is more in terms of violent incidents and attacks attributed to the group than any real danger of being overrun by the Taliban.
A NATO report leaked in early 2012 showed how well entrenched the Taliban has become over the years, both in terms of gaining public support as well as strengthening its capabilities to take on the ISAF, especially in the eastern and southern provinces where it enjoyed considerable control and support. It is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of support that the Taliban enjoys among the Afghan populace as both sides—the insurgents as well as the international and Afghan government coalition—would seek to manipulate numbers to support their cause.

To be continued...