Critical Triangle continues ......

Pakistan’s rationale in joining the war on terror ultimately came down to “critical concerns” meaning “strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir.” This statement has been interpreted as meaning nuclear weapons and its freedom of action in Kashmir. However even this was half hearted. What emerged was that Pakistan
evidently thought it could use its influence
with the Taliban to isolate and hand over al Qaeda. If Pakistan thought it could
safeguard its Afghan interests by joining the US alliance it was wrong. The ISI effectively nudged the US to get the Taliban to get rid of al Qaeda. Even after the Taliban rejected the US demand that Osama bin Laden be handed over, Gen. Mahmud travelled to Kandahar to meet Mullah Omar and advised US Ambassador Chamberlin that “real victory will come in negotiation.

The Taliban, however, remained intransigent with Mullah Zaeef declaring on 21 September that the Taliban “were ready, if necessary, for war with the US.”

However by 22 September, Mullah Zaeef was, in effect, parroting the Pakistani line of “urging restraint” while still refusing to hand over Bin Laden. The US, however, was not in a mood to negotiate and rapidly threw in its lot with the Northern Alliance, which was now perceived by the ISI as being an Indian-Iranian- Russian proxy Given the Taliban’s intransigence in handing over bin Laden the Pakistanis faced a dilemma. As General Mahmud put it, he wanted “Pakistan to avoid the fallout from a US attack on its neighbour.” The script, however, played differently to what the Pakistanis had expected.

To be continued....