Critical Triangle continues ....

By February 1999, the South Asian peace process was well underway with Prime Minister Vajpayee’s bus trip to Lahore and specifically to the Minar-e-Pakistan to symbolise India’s acceptance of Pakistani statehood. The US was particularly delighted by these developments, but soon these were dashed by the onset of the Kargil crisis which saw a Pakistani armed incursion cutting off the northern region of Ladakh from the rest of India.

This was very different from the insurgency in the region because of direct Pakistani involvement, fire support, and the quantum of the threat it posed.

That crisis saw the US (and China) decisively supporting the Indian stand. For Pakistan this was particularly perplexing as the US had imposed equal sanctions on both India and Pakistan for the nuclear tests even though Pakistan felt it had been goaded into that action. Refusing to apply the same moral equivalence this time around and singling out Pakistan was seen as proof of a tilt against Pakistan. This view became pronounced when Nawaz Sharif was denied a face-saving exit during his Washington visit on 4 July 1999, where he was, in effect, arm twisted into announcing a withdrawal.

While it initiated the end of the Kargil crisis, the huge public opinion fallout in Pakistan and the search for scapegoats for the crisis, effectively precipitated the coup of 12 October 1999.

Bilateral ties had already been strained over Kashmir, terrorism and the nuclear issue and the suspension of civilian rule simply made matters worse. Kargil, however, did set an important precedent—one where America was no longer willing to give Pakistan a face-saving exit and refused to accept threats of a “fundamentalist takeover.” This was the start of the US determination to avoid being scapegoated by Pakistan and to feed the Pakistani “stab in back” narrative. As Clinton told Nawaz Sharif “you’ve put me in the middle today, set the US up to fail and I won't let it happen.

To be continued......