Chapter 1 continues...

Although the US had initially warned that it would completely withdraw from the region if the BSA was not signed by the end of 2013, it later showed more flexibility but continues to insist that the pact should be signed as soon as possible.

Suggestions of the ‘zero option’ implying complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan have also crept into the discourse on Afghanistan. Although this is considered by many to be merely a pressure tactic used by the US government to gain some leverage over the Afghan Government during negotiations for the BSA, there are concerns within Afghanistan that the complete withdrawal may actually materialise if the BSA is not signed in time. The uncertainty about the future of the US role in the region has intensified the already tense environment in Afghanistan.
Irrespective of the number of US troops in Afghanistan post- 2014, it is obvious that the residual US force is going to be significantly smaller than the present levels. It will be even smaller than what the US military considers to be the optimal level. Even at the peak of the 2009 surge, ISAF was unable to subdue the resurgence of the Taliban. In addition to the reduction of numbers, the potency of the residual force is likely to be undermined further by the concessions already granted by the US to the Afghan government. Night raids, unilateral special operations and control over prisons were all military tactics considered to be highly effective by the US, but have now been ended. Given these reductions and concessions, it is fair to assume that the residual force would find it extremely difficult to make any significant headway against the Taliban.

A RESURGENT TALIBAN?
Despite the intensive military campaigns and billions of dollars spent on fighting the Taliban, the insurgency continues to survive, and is particularly strong in certain provinces of Afghanistan. Of the different extremist and terrorist groups sustaining the insurgency, the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin remain the biggest headache. Much of the Taliban’s sophisticated offensive capabilities come from the Haqqani Network.

To be continued...