A Strategy to Deter Terrorism continues....

In the case of terrorist menace, because of their ideological and religious beliefs, many terrorists place extreme value on their political objectives relative to other ends (e.g. life and property). For this reason, it appears impossible that a deterrer could hold at risk something personal or of organization of sufficient value to terrorists such that their behavior is affected. Put differently, if the terrorists’ motivation is high enough, then even a small probability of a successful operation is sufficient for them, and hence even a high probability of personal or organizational punishment will not deter them. Further, because the interests of terrorists and states seems so opposed, it also appears impossible that the two sides could agree on a state of affairs that both prefer to that in which each does its worst against the other. Hence, compromise with a terrorist group is not a feasible alternative strategy.

High levels of motivation often make terrorists highly susceptible to a deterrence strategy that targets their political goals. Highly motivated terrorists, because they hold their political goals dear, are reluctant to run even low-level risks that hurt their political aims. This magnifies the coercive leverage of strategies that target political ends. Herein thus lies the clue on how to deter terrorism: a strategy to hurt the terrorist’s political goals.


Lexicographic Ordering of Terrorist
Preferences

Terrorists are highly irrational by mainstream norms, but not completely. A growing body of literature that shows that terrorist groups (though not necessarily every individual who engages in terrorist activities) usually have lexicographically ordered goals and choose their strategy accordingly. Lexicographic ordering is like words ordered in a dictionary or names in a directory. Entries are ordered by first alphabet, then second, and so on.

A terrorist is motivated lexicographically. If its political goal is not likely to be met by a particular action, it will look no further. If it is, then it will look further at alternatives of actions, targets and weapons.

Thus, terrorists usually have a range of objectives lexicographically ordered in preference. States also have preferences over these same objectives.

To be continued...