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A Strategy to Deter Terrorism continues....
Trager and Zagorcheva have argued that the claim—that deterrence is ineffective against terrorists—is wrong. Their central thesis is that even the most highly motivated terrorists can be deterred by instead holding at risk their political goals, rather than their life, liberty or property.
From a policy perspective, therefore, the ability of a terrorist-targeted nation to put political goals of terrorists at risk stands the best chance deterring and, hence, becomes the most important objective of counter-terrorism policy. But the contours and structure of a counter-terrorism policy, and the selection of instruments for implementation of the policy, has to be nation-specific and terrorist organization-centric. There cannot, therefore, be a general global strategy of deterrence against terrorism.
Deterrence in the Context of a Counter-terrorist Strategy
Of course, deterrence is one of several classes of strategies for countering terrorism. Other strategies propounded invoke solving the root causes and problems, which include persuasion (or “winning hearts and minds”), economic aid, democratization, appeasement, and brute military force of search and destroy. In this study, we advocate for India deterrence as our primary strategy. Other strategies mentioned above may be tried as supplementary and secondary, and sequenced properly.
Indeed, deterrence can be achieved by threat of counter-vailing action if a terrorist acts in a certain way, or if he does not act in a certain way. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (pp. 70-71), contrasts deterrence (the threat to take hostile action if the adversary acts) with compellence (the threat to take hostile action unless the adversary acts). We shall follow this terminology.
Moreover, traditional view of deterrence in strategic studies literature implies the scope for a bargain: that both sides agree to co-operate on a state of affairs that both prefer to alternatives they face. This is game theory the search is called “Nash equilibrium” named after the Nobel Laureate Princeton Professor John Nash. Deterrence, therefore, is not just about making threats; it is also about making offers for good behaviour. Deterrence and compellence is thus about finding the right combination of threat and offer, and we shall apply this principle to countering terrorism in India.
To be continued...