Bumla-Tawang-Sela-Bomdila continues....

In the second week of November 2008, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declassified almost 70 percent of its diplomatic archives dating from 1960 to 1965. One among the 41,097 items revealed the reason behind China’s sudden call of truce in its border war with India in late 1962.

Some observers such as Allen Whiting have surmised, that the three-week lull was probably intended to provide an opportunity for India to rethink their approach and abandon their ‘Forward Policy’. It is also true, though, that a pause after any initial major operational move has been a standard policy in classical Chinese warfare strategy, in order to see how the enemy reacts, and to adjust one’s policy or tactics accordingly. It is believed that the decisions of 6th October and 16th October were for a multi-stage war.

Indian forces would first be given a sharp and bloody warning, after which Chinese troops would halt and re-organize for the next offensive. If India did not re-orient its frontier policy, then the next stage would be a massive assault to the southern fringe of the Himalayas. It is thus possible that had Nehru agreed to boundary talks after the Zhou proposal of 24th October, the next phase of the Chinese offensive may never have taken place. The 14th November letter gave the Chinese the feeling that India did not want negotiations, and the Chinese military offensive was re-continued from

16th November onwards.

To be continued....