Chapter 2 continues…

The ISI, in fact, attempted to use these very lobbies to influence Mullah Omar and also tried to use Afghans trained at Pakistani madrasas to infiltrate Omar’s inner circle.

There were a number of instances when the Taliban openly defied Pakistan. The first major expression of Taliban independence was their decision to take Herat in 1995, pointedly ignoring Pakistani advice to the contrary.

Similarly, the Taliban had refused to pay heed to Pakistan’s requests for freeing the Iranian diplomats captured by the group in Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997, or to not blow up the ancient Buddha statues in Bamiyan in 2001. Moreover, contrary to expectations, the Taliban neither recognised the Durand Line nor did they drop Afghanistan’s claims over a part of the NWFP.

It was the issue of the Taliban providing a haven to Osama bin Laden, which probably caused the biggest strain in Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban. Osama, who had been expelled by Saudi Arabia, first sought refuge in Sudan and finally arrived in Afghanistan.

Following the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, orchestrated by al Qaeda from its base in Afghanistan, the US had increased pressure on Pakistan to demand the Taliban to expel Osama from Afghanistan. Under growing international pressure, Sharif made a late effort to persuade the Taliban to accept US demands regarding Osama and al Qaeda. However, after constant rejection of such demands by the Taliban, Sharif travelled to Abu Dhabi with the message that he was prepared to take tougher measures against the Afghans if he had the support of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Pervez Musharraf ’s government had also sent a delegation to Afghanistan to attempt to persuade Mullah Omar to either expel Osama or hand him over to his native government. Even post-9/11, Musharraf attempted on three or four occasions to convince Omar to hand over Osama to the US, but to no avail.

To be continued…