Chapter 2 continues…

They had also announced that when peace and security was achieved in Afghanistan they would allow the people to form a national Islamic government. Nojumi rightly points out that the Taleban leadership’s political call for peace and security not only deactivated many political groups in Afghanistan, it also successfully created a confusing environment among the remaining political groups.

The scope and confusion about this new movement was wide, and wider among politicians and general public in Afghanistan. This confusion provided a great environment for the Taleban to move forward and influence many areas across the country.

The Taleban, in their advance, made agreements with local communities that if they submitted their loyality to them, they could continue their normal lives. They also integrated the local armed forces under their military organization and supported them with a generous cash flow that came from external sources. In the case of Helmand province (the province rich in poppy production and hence a lucrative source of local revenue), the Taleban asked Abdul Qhaffar Aakhondzadah after seizing the capital to surrender arms. When he refused, severe fighting erupted between the two sides and Aakhondzadah had to retreat to Ghor to take refuge in the territories controlled by Ismail Khan.

In late 1994, the Taleban forces moved towards Zabul and in a rapid military move, soon invaded Ghazni, the stronghold of Qari Baba (allied with Rabbani), whose force was attacked by armed groups loyal to Hekhmatyar. The Taleban were successful in defeating the forces of Hekhmatyar and since Qari Baba was a Rabbani supporter the Taleban disarmed his forces and established control over the area by January 1995.

In February, the Taleban defeated forces loyal to Hekhmatyar in the province of Logar, and in a matter of days they captured Maidan Shahr, the capital of Logar.

To be continued…