External Actors in the Afghan Problem continues....

Both the route and the means of transportation taken by Iranian weapons and material transfers to the United Front had shifted in the wake of Taleban military victories. Following the fall of Herat and Kabul (in September 1996) to the Taleban, the supply of weapons, men and other materials from Iran was redirected to other United Front-held cities, most notably Bamiyan and Mazar-e-Sharif. Both cities possess airfields capable of handling mid-sized cargo aircrafts such as the Soviet-designed An-24 and An-32 and American-designed C-130 Hercules, all in service with the Iranian military.

Numerous eyewitness accounts have identified Iranian military cargo planes taking off from and arriving at the Bamiyan and Mazar-e Sharif airports during the period 1996 to 1998.

Following the capture of Bamiyan and Mazar-e Sharif by the Taleban, Iran was forced to rely on a circuitous land route to deliver supplies of weapons and goods to its friends in Afghanistan. An Iranian engineering team was involved in the construction of a new bridge across the Amu Darya river at Dasht-i Qalah in 1999. Such a bridge allowed for high-volume traffic to reach United Front forces in Afghanistan from Dushanbe, Tajikistan, as well as from the Russian-Tajik military base and airfield at Kulab in Tajikistan, a key supply transit point.

Iran provided military training to United Front forces via small teams of approximately five to eight military instructors who periodically arrived from Iran to lead courses at a training centre near the village of Farkhar, in Takhar province in northern Afghanistan. Around 80-150 men—roughly the equivalent of junior-level officers—used to train at the camp at any given time, receiving instruction in tactics, leadership skills, logistics and other skills.

To be continued.....