Chapter 2 continues…

Although the Pakistani government kept issuing statements denying their links with the Taleban and terming the movement as an indigenous movement of the Talebs, yet it was becoming obvious that without the logistical and military support of the Pakistani Intelligence and army, it would not have been possible for the Talebs to gain military victory in almost ninety percent of Afghan territory. It was definitely something much deeper than an indigenous reaction to the unscrupulous power struggle by the Mujahideen factions.

Neamatollah Nojumi traces the close links of the Taleban movement to Pakistan. He says that the ideological formation of Taleban has historical roots in the emergence of the mushrooming growth of thousands of Madresahs across Pakistan. During the Afghan conflict, the religious schools in Pakistan, particularly those attended by Afghans, were associated with the war.

Many graduate students and teachers routinely participated in the armed struggle against the PDPA and the Soviets. In the beginning, students from these schools went to Afghanistan to manage the religious affairs of the Mujahideen groups. Over the course of time these students received military training inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Many also became full-time armed activists inside Afghanistan and formed local groups. There were many who became members of the two powerful Islamic parties in Pakistan; Jamaat Islami Pakistan (JIP), led by Qazi Hussein Ahmed; and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami Pakistan (JUIP), led by Maulana Fazl-ul-Rahman and they participated in political- religious activities in many parts of Pakistan, particularly along the Afghan border.

Taleban supremo Mullah Mohammad Omar, a Durrani Pashtun, was a religious teacher in a local madrassa prior to the Soviet invasion and was affiliated with the JUIP and followed the Deobandi school of thought. Nojumi50 rightly argues that the absence of a nationally accepted leadership allowed the Taleban to emerge strongly and aggressively.

To be continued…