External Actors in the Afghan Problem continues...

Pakistan’s ISI first backed the Hizb-i-Islami leader, Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, and the bulk of US support was channeled through him.
After he failed to consolidate power, the ISI played a role in creating the Taleban and in 1996 Pakistan became the first country to recognize the new regime.

By early 2000 Pakistan appeared to have moved closer to the Taleban, believing that the latter would offer strategic depth in any future conflict with India, and extended it recognition in 1997. The principal supplier to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was Pakistan.

Notwithstanding its official denials, it is an open secret that Pakistan assisted the Taleban forces by facilitating the recruitment of fighters, offering military training, and planning pivotal military operations, while allowing arms for the Taleban to transit its territory.

The extent of this support, particularly during the Taleban’s
offensive in the north in late 2000, was criticized implicitly by the UN Secretary General in a report to the General Assembly in November. In the report, he expressed his distress that “a significant number of non-Afghan personnel, largely from Pakistani Madrassas, are … taking active part in the fighting, most, if not all, on the side of the Taleban and there also appears to be outside involvement in the planning and logistical support of (the Taleban’s) military operations.”

To be continued...