Chapter 2 continues…

What is most worrying is that ethnicity, sectarianism and lust for power rather than national interest have come to determine the loyalties and policies of the various factions. That would explain how the hard-line Islamist Gulbadin Hekhmatyar and the erstwhile Communist commander General Rashid Dostum, who would normally be antagonistic towards each other had lined up against President Burhanuddin Rabbani and his allies. The first is a Pushtun and the latter is an Uzbek. Their backers in Pakistan and Uzbekistan helped them overthrow the Tajik rule of Rabbani and his commander Ahmed Shah Masood.

Neighbouring Turkmenistan, which is wary of Uzbek ambitions, was backing yet another guerrilla leader, Ismael Khan, who was based in Herat. He had been fighting alongside Rabbani’s men against Dostum to wrest control of the Afghan provinces bordering Turkmenistan. Another complicating factor is the impact of the ethnic feuds in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on the course of the war in Afghanistan.”

Such regional politics and complexities was worsening the political situation in Afghanistan and the UN Secretary General was asked to send his Special Representative to undertake the arduous task of peace making and national reconciliation.

Apart from factional fighting and support from the neighbouring countries, each of the Afghan provinces had its own autonomous or semi- independent government, run by the area’s most powerful Mujahideen commander, or a shura of commanders, representing various Mujahideen factions or warlords. Some of these were loosely linked to the various Afghan political factions, but by and large they made their own decisions. And even the high profile powerful leaders of Kabul, Charasyab or Peshawar were not prepared to go against the will of their respective commanders either.

It was often argued that power–sharing in most of the provinces had little to do with religious ideology, and tribal and other political consideration usually took precedence. For this reason, the commanders who had their personal militias or pockets of tribal influence had greater say than the important mujahideen leaders.

To be continued…