External Actors in the Afghan Problem continues...

One commander considered it a ‘dumb’ idea as it was not considered to be a good idea to lose ten thousand lives.

In another commentator’s words, “a major Afghan war decision was taken by the Pakistanis with no Afghans present, but with the US ambassador looking on.” Many Afghans resented this blatant interference and several commanders were alienated. In the October 1990 meeting of national commanders Shura in Kunar, Afghans blocked the participation of ISI Chief Asad Durrani and opposed the ISI plan of a direct attack on Kabul.

By 1994, Pakistan was disgusted with the civil war and disappointed due to constant failures of their main ally. Hekhmatyar, started to look for new “potential Pashtun proxies in Afghanistan.”Initially Benazir Bhutto’s Pashtun interior minister, Major General (Rtd.)

Naseerullah Khan Babar did the ground breaking work of finding other potential proxies. Later, ISI took the charge of providing logistic support and broker alliances of General Dostum, General Shahnawaz Tanai and former commander Jalaluddin Haqqani with Taleban. These alliances were vital and provided the Taleban with necessary material and technical edge to defeat their rivals.

In addition, the close alliance of the Taleban with religious seminaries in Pakistan provided them with enough foot soldiers to fight at different fronts in Afghanistan.

ISI instructed provincial governments of Balochistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) not to allow any political activities of Afghans who were against the Taleban. Many anti-Taleban individuals were asked to leave Pakistan, thus, any organized opposition to the Taleban was prevented.

To be continued...