Bumla-Tawang-Sela-Bomdila continues ......

The unordered and premature abandonment of its defensive positions

by 1st Sikh, began on night 17th/18th November when 2nd Sikh LI was being pulled back through them that night, from Kye La into the Sela main defenses. Once this happened, control over both units by their own officers became difficult. This was the precise beginning of the debacle at Sela. But there were other players who had contributed, other than the Chinese who had been getting the better of 2nd Sikh LI before their withdrawal into the Sela main defences.

As per the brigade commander’s orders, 1st Sikh had been ordered to abandon the Sela defences the last of all on night 18th/19th November, but Lt. Col. B.N. (‘Baij’) Mehta, Commanding Officer (CO) 1st Sikh, had on his own given orders to his 2 I/C, Adjutant and QM for the withdrawal of the battalion on 2330 hours

on 17th November.

This undoubtedly added to the confusion and jitteriness of his troops. In the event, this unplanned abandonment totally compromised the planned withdrawals of the other battalions, 4th Garhwal Rifles, 13th Dogra, and 4th Sikh LI, as well as of 62 Brigade HQ and the smaller elements of the fighting and supporting arms.

The debacle in Kameng has been the subject of much debate and of numerous books, and is known for the ignominy earned by the Indian Army for the non-battles of Sela and Bomdila. The reasons are:

To be continued.....